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CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-The Supreme Court Can't Have It Both
Ways Under RFRA: The Tale of Two Compelling Interest Tests. Gonzales v.
0 Centro EpiritaBeneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
Aaron D. Bieber*
INTRODUCTION

0 Centro Epirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV) is a Christian Spiritist
sect based in Brazil, with an American branch of approximately 130 individuals. Founded in Brazil in 1961, the UDV church blends aspects of Christian
theology with traditional Brazilian indigenous religious beliefs.' In 1993, the
UDV officially established a United States branch headquartered in Santa Fe,
New Mexico.2 Central and essential to the UDV's faith is receiving communion
by ingesting hoasca (pronounced "wass-ca"), a sacramental tea made from two
plants unique to the Amazon region. 3 One of the plants, psychotria viridis, contains dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a hallucinogen whose effects are enhanced by
alkaloids from the other plant, banisteriopsiscaapi.4 Hoasca is made by brewing
together these two indigenous Brazilian plants.5 Members of the UDV believe that
taking hoasca during communion helps them understand, perceive, and connect
with God.6 UDV regards the two plants as sacred and does not substitute other
plants or materials as its sacrament. 7 The UDV considers the use of hoasca outside

*Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2008. I'd like to thank my wife for constant
love and support during this project. I would also like to thank Professor Stephen M.
Feldman for his insight and guidance.
10 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 E Supp. 2d 1236,
1240 (D.N.M. 2002).
2 Id. at 1240.
1 0 Centro, 126. S. Ct. at 1217.
4
Id.
10 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342 E3d 1170, 1175
(2003). The court explained:
Psychotria contains DMT; banisteriopsis contains harmala alkaloids,
known as beta-carbolines, that allow DMT's hallucinogenic effects
to occur by suppressing monoamine oxidase enzymes in the digestive
system that otherwise would break down the DMT. Ingestion of the
combination of plants allows DMT to reach the brain in levels sufficient to significantly alter consciousness.
Id. at 1175.
6 Brief for Respondents at 5, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal,
126 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 (2006) (No. 04-1084). The UDV alleged these facts which are not
disputed significantly. Id.
7

Id.
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of religious ceremonies to be sacrilegious.' Unfortunately for the UDV, DMT,
along with "any material, compound, mixture, or preparation, which contains
any quantity of [DMT]," is listed in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA).'
Hoasca is prepared by church officials in Brazil and exported to the United
States since these plants do not grow naturally in the United States.1 ° On May
21, 1999, United States Customs Service agents seized a shipment of three drums
of hoasca labeled "tea extract."" A subsequent investigation revealed that the
American branch of the UDV had received fourteen prior shipments of hoasca.12
The inspectors seized the intercepted shipment and threatened the UDV with
prosecution under the CSA.13 UDV filed suit against United States Attorney
General John Ashcroft and other federal law enforcement officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the government officials from applying the
CSA to hoasca. 14 UDV alleged, inter alia, that applying the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA) to sacramental hoasca violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (RFRA)." 5 Before trial, the UDV moved for a preliminary injunction to
allow its members to continue their religious practices until the issue could be
determined on the merits. 16
During a hearing on the preliminary injunction, the Government conceded
that the challenged application of the CSA would satisfy the UDV's prima facie
case under RFRA and substantially burden the UDV's sincere exercise of religion. 17

6. Respondents noted that "UDV's ceremonies also include recitation of church
law, invocations, question-and-answer exchanges, and religious teachings ....A person
must be eighteen years old to join ... prospective members often wait as long as two years
before their first [hoasca] ceremony." Id.
9 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801, 812(c), Schedule l(c) (2006). A drug's
placement in Schedule I indicates that the substance "has a high potential for abuse," that
it "has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and that
"[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug... under medical supervision." Id.
at § 812(b)(1).
100 Centro, 342 E3d at 1175.
Id.
120 Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1217.
8 Id. at 5,

13Id.

14Id.
150 Centro, 282 E Supp. 2d at 1252-55 (citing Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (2000)). RFRA states that the government may substantially burden a
person's free exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1
(2000).
1'0 Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1217.
170 Centro, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1252.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/7
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The United States argued, however, the injunction did not violate RFRA because
applying the CSA was the least restrictive means of advancing three compelling
governmental interests: (1) protecting the health and safety of UDV members; (2)
preventing the diversion of hoasca to recreational uses; and (3) complying with
the 1971 United Nations Convention on Pyschotropic Substances. 8 The district
court heard arguments from both parties on the health risks of hoasca and the
potential for its diversion away from the church.' 9 The district court found the
evidence regarding the health risks of hoasca to be "in equipoise." 21 In addition, the
court determined that the evidence was "virtually balanced" regarding the hoasca's
diversion away from the church to recreational users. 2' In light of such an even
showing, the court held that the Government failed to demonstrate a compelling
interest to justify the application of the CSA after it acknowledged the substantial burden enforcement would have on the UDV's sincere religious exercise.22
The court further rejected the Government's position that it had a compelling
governmental interest in complying with the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic
23
Substances by finding that the convention does not apply to hoasca.
Since the Government did not meet its burden under RFRA, and the UDV
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success as to their RFRA claim, the district court turned to the question of whether the preliminary injunction should
be granted to the UDV.24 Under Tenth Circuit law, "[a] movant is entitled to a
preliminary injunction if he can establish the following: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2) irreparable injury to the movant
if the preliminary injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to the movant
18Id.at 1252-53.
19 Id. at

1255-66. The Government and UDV presented conflicting expert testimony
about the health risks hoasca posed to the members of the UDV and the risk of diversion hoasca would have outside of the UDV's religious uses. Id.On the issue of health
risks, the Government presented evidence to the effect that the use of hoasca, or DMT
more generally, can cause adverse drug reactions including psychotic reactions and cardiac
irregularities. Id. at 1256-62. UDV countered by citing studies documenting the safety
of its sacramental use of hoasca and presenting evidence that minimized the likelihood
of the health risks raised by the Government. Id. at 1255-62. On the issue of diversion
of hoasca, the Government cited a general rise in the illicit use'of hallucinogens, and
pointed to interest in the illegal use of DMT and hoasca in particular. Id. at 1262-65.
UDV countered by emphasizing the thinness of any market for hoasca, the relatively small
amounts imported by the church, and the absence of any diversion problem in the past.
Id.at 1265-66.
20Id. at 1262.
21Id. at 1262, 1266. On the issue of health risks, "in equipoise" meant that evidence
presented by both sides was "virtually balanced." Id.at 1262. It is also noteworthy that on
the issue of risk of diversion the evidence presented by the UDV's experts "may even tip
the scale slightly in favor of the Plaintiff's position." Id. at 1266.
22

Id.at 1255.

23

Id. at 1266-69 (citing 32 U.S.T. 543, T.I.A.S. No. 9725).
Centro, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1241, 1270-71.

24 0
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outweighs the injury to the other party under the preliminary injunction; and (4)
the injunction is not adverse to the public interest."25 In considering irreparable
injury, the district court stated that "tenth circuit law indicates that the violations of the religious exercise rights protected under RFRA represent irreparable
injuries. '26 Next, the court weighed the threatened injury to the movant (the
UDV) against the injury to the other party (the Government) and considered
27
whether the grant of the injunction would be adverse to the public interest.
The district court stated that the Government's inability to prove a compelling
interest coupled with the public's interest in protecting First Amendment rights
satisfied these elements. 28 In conclusion, the court held that since the UDV was
likely to succeed on the merits of its claim under RFRA, the grant of a preliminary
29
injunction was proper.
Due to its findings, the district court entered a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the Government from enforcing the CSA against the UDV for its
importation and use of hoasca3 0 The injunction allowed the church to import the
tea if it complied with federal permits, restricted control over the tea to persons of
UDV church authority, and warned of the dangers of hoasca to those particularly
susceptible UDV members. 3
The Government appealed the preliminary injunction and the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction.3 2 Subsequently, a majority of the Tenth Circuit sitting en banc affirmed.33
The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for certiorari to determine
whether the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction
4
stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca.1

Id. at 1241 (citing Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Centro, 282 E Supp. 2d at 1270-71 (citing Kikumura, 242 E3d at 963).
27 Id. at 1271.
25

26 0

28
29

Id.
Id.

3

Id. at 1270-71.
See 0 Centro, 126 S.Ct. at 1218; Appellant Pet. for Cert. at 5-9, Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S.Ct. 1211 (2006) (No. 04-1084); Appellee
Mem. in Opp'n to Pet. for Cert. at 5-7, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
Do Vegetal, 126 S.Ct. 1211 (2006) (No. 04-1084).
32 0 Centro, 342 F.3d at 1181 (holding that "[the] UDV has demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the claim for an exemption to the CSA for sacramental use of
hoasca").
1 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir.
2004). The court "granted rehearing to review the different standards by which we evaluate the grant of preliminary injunctions, and to decide how those standards should be
applied in this case." Id. at 975.
34Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 544 U.S. 973 (2005).
1

31
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The Supreme Court held that "[t]he courts below did not err in determining
that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a
compelling interest in barring the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca."35
This case note will demonstrate how the Supreme Court's interpretation of
RFRA is contradictory, and does not give a clear definition of which compelling interest test RFRA demands. Specifically, this case note will examine the
indistinct legislative intent of RFRA and demonstrate how the Court's decision is
ambiguous in light of the legislative intent. When enacting and codifying RFRA,
Congress approved of stronger, more fact specific applications of compelling
interest standards previously applied by the Supreme Court, and a weaker, more
generalized applications that the Court used throughout the later half of the
twentieth century.
First, this case note will display how the Court's approval of a stronger and
a weaker compelling interest standard does not clarify which standard the Court
will use in the future. Second, this case note will analyze the Court's reasoning
in denying the Government's proffered compelling interest of the uniformity of
enforcement of the CSA for denying a religious exemption and explain how the
Court gives conflicting reasoning to justify their holding on that matter. Finally,
this case note will conclude that 0 Centro gives a nebulous and conflicted interpretation of RFRA that is unsuitable for future use.
BACKGROUND

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment guarantees that, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof .... ,,3' From 1791 to just prior to the 1960s, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Free Exercise Clause protected religiously motivated beliefs, not
7
actions, against general regulation.1
In 1961, in Braunfield v. Brown, the Supreme Court decided that a Sunday
closing law did not inflict constitutionally recognized harm on Orthodox Jewish
shopkeepers, who kept a Saturday Sabbath, because the laws did not directly
stop their religious practice. 38 The Court held that the state can regulate conduct
by a generally applicable law despite its indirect burden on religious observance
unless the state may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose that
310

Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1213.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming a Mormon leader's bigamy
conviction). Cf Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (recognizing two
aspects of free exercise: freedom to believe and freedom to act, and that the former is
absolute and the later is not).
38 Braunfield,366 U.S. 599, 606-10 (1961).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007
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burden.39 The shopkeepers argued that the purpose of the statute, a day of rest for
the people of the state, could still be fulfilled by granting an exemption because
they rested on Saturdays.4 ° The Court found, however, that the possibility that the
shopkeepers might receive an economic advantage over those adhering to the statute justified denial of an exemption.41 Braunfield represented the possibility courts
could grant an exemption to a general law of applicability for religious conduct.42
But under Braunfiela, the Court still gave much deference to the Government's
reasons for enforcing a general law despite its admitted negative consequences on
43
religious exercise.

The Court Increased Protection Under the Free Exercise Clause
Protection under the Free Exercise Clause dramatically increased after the
Supreme Court's decisions in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.4 4 In
Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist woman was fired from her job because her
religion prohibited her from working on Saturdays. 5 Since she could not work on
Saturdays, she was ineligible for South Carolina's unemployment compensation
plan. 46 The Court considered the question whether a law denying the plaintiff
unemployment compensation benefits violated her right to free exercise.47 The
Court looked at three criteria: (1) whether the law infringed on a person's free
31 Id.
40

at 607.
Id. at 608.

41 Id. at

608-09. The Court also noted that denying the exemption would reduce the

amount
of commercial noise and activity. Id. at 608.
42

See Tania Saison, Restoring Obscurity: The Shortcomings ofthe ReligiousFreedom Restoration

Act, 28 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 653, 664-65 (1995). Recognizing the change that

Braunfield brought about in free exercise jurisprudence, Saison stated:
Though the claimants did not prevail in that case, the manner which
the Supreme Court reached its decision marked a radical departure
from the Reynolds rationale, and suggested that the Court would not
always accord deference to legislative enactments. Unlike the approach
used in Reynolds, the Braunfield Court explored the effect the statute
would have on religious practice. A balancing informed the decision.
Id. (citations omitted).
13 Braunfied,366 U.S. at 606. Writing for the majority, Justice Warren stated: "[iut cannot
be expected, much less required, that legislators enact no law regulating conduct that may
in some way result in an economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to others
because of the special practices of various religions." Id. See also Justice Brennan's dissent:
"It is not even the interest in seeing that everyone rests one day a week, for appellants'
religion requires that they take such a rest. It is mere convenience of having everyone rest
on the same day." Id. at 614 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
11 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
46

Id.

17

Id. at 402-03, 407-08.
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exercise of religion; (2) whether the law served a compelling state interest; and
(3) whether the law was proportionately made to achieve the means by the
method least intrusive of the religious freedom. 8 Despite the fact the law was
not explicitly written to discriminate against Seventh Day Adventists, the Court
stated that a law of general applicability could violate an individual's free exercise
rights whether the law placed a direct or indirect burden on the person.4 9
The Sherbert Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to unemployment
compensation. 5° The Court reasoned that the Government's reason of uniform
application of the unemployment compensation statute, when applied to the
specific facts of the case, was not a compelling interest because the government
had not shown evidence of "unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections
to Saturday work."'" Sherbert demanded the Government show fact-specific evidence of how allowing an exemption to the plaintiff would dilute the unemployment compensation fund and disrupt work scheduling.52 In addition, the holding
required the Government to show there were no alternative regulations that
would fulfill its interest without infringing First Amendment rights. 53 Although
Sherbert found that the Government's interest in the uniform application of the
unemployment compensation statute was not compelling, it suggested that a
bare interest in uniform application of a law might justify burdens on religious
54
practice.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this standard nine years later in Wisconsin v.
Yoder.5 5 In that case, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause entitled Old
Order Amish to an exemption from Wisconsin compulsory school laws for children
between the ages of fourteen and sixteen. 56 The high court applied the compelling
interest test in which it measured the state's interest for the education of its youth
against the likely impact on the Amish community if compliance were forced by
" Id. at 403, 404 (citing Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 at 607 (1961) ("For '[i]f
the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or it is
to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even
though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect."')).
19Id. at 403-04.
50 Id. at 408-09.
"' Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407-09 (reasoning that there was a need for uniform application
of the unemployment statute to prevent "unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work").
52 Id. at 407.
53Id.
54Id. at
408. The Court noted that applying a Sunday closing law to Orthodox Jewish
merchants, who were already closed on Saturday due to their religious practice, had been
justified by a "strong state interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers."
Id. (citing Braunfieldv. Brown, 366 U.S. at 605).
55Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
56

Id. at 234-36.
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the law's criminal penalties.5 7 As in Sherbert, the Yoder Court rejected sweeping
claims of a compelling interest in uniform application in a general law of applicability.58 Instead, courts must use a fact specific inquiry to "examine the interest
that the State seeks to promote by its requirement of compulsory education to age
16, and that impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the
claimed Amish exemption. 5 9 In rejecting the State's asserted compelling interest
of uniformity in the compulsory attendance law, the Yoder Court again affirmed
that general laws of applicability can violate the Free Exercise Clause.6" By holding that the Government, in this instance, did not have a compelling interest in
uniform application of its education laws, the Court focused its decision on the
unique history and success of the Old Amish Order's community in educating its
youth. 61 The compelling interest set forth by Sherbert and Yoder has been said to
62
be the "high water mark" of free exercise.

57

1d. at 214-34. Although providing public schools ranked at the "very apex" of the function of the state, and the state had a very strong interest in the health, welfare, and public
education of its children, applied to the facts of the case, the compulsory school law
"would do little to serve those interests." Id. at 213, 222.
58 Id. at 221.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 220. The Court stated "[a] regulation neutral on its face, may in application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion." Id.
61Id. at 222-26.
62 Ira C. Lupu, Of Time And The RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REv. 171, 185 (1995). Professor Lupu stated that between
1972 and 1980,
[T]he Court had announced a strict review standard to govern claims,
and had not yet created exceptions or limiting doctrines to funnel
claims in a different, more government favoring direction. During that
period, however, those principles were never put to any test and no
Supreme Court decisions relied upon them.

Id. at 185.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/7
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The Supreme CourtApplied the Compelling Interest Test
In the years following Sherbert, the Court upheld numerous laws against
free exercise challenges using the compelling interest test. 63 The only exception
to the Supreme Court's deference to the government during this time was a line
of unemployment compensation cases. ' The Supreme Court used a variety of
methods to deny free exercise exemptions during this time and academics differ

"3Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (denying claimant's exemption from the
Universal Military Training and Service Act because language defining "religious training
and belief" as used in the statute exempting conscientious objectors from military service
excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on basis of essentially
political, sociological or economic considerations that they will not participate in the
war); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (denying religious conscientious objector's
claim to benefits under the Veterans Readjustment Act because the legislation furthered
the objectives of enhancing and making more attractive service in the armed forces of
the United States which was plainly within the power of Congress to raise and support
armies); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252 (1982); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying claimant's
requested classification under the tax code because the government's fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education substantially outweighed
whatever burden denial of tax benefits placed on the exercise of the religious beliefs of
nonprofit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially discriminatory admission
standards on the basis of religion); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471
U.S. 290 (1985) (denying claimant's exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act because
the Act placed no substantial burden on the free exercise of the claimants); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); O'Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (denying claimant's exemption from prison regulations
because State prison officials acted in reasonable manner in precluding prisoners who
were members of Islamic faith from attending religious service held on Friday afternoons,
and prison regulations to that effect did not violate free exercise of religion clause of the
First Amendment); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
64 See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employ. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denying
unemployment benefits to applicant whose religion forbade him to fabricate weapons
found unconstitutional under Free Exercise Clause); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (denying unemployment benefits to religious
convert who resigned position that required her to work on the Sabbath found unconstitutional under Free Exercise); Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829
(1989) (denying unemployment benefits to a claimant who refused a position because
the job would have required him to work on Sunday found unconstitutional under Free
Exercise Clause, even though refusal was not based on tenets or dogma of an established
religious sect).
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as to classification of these methods.65 One way the Supreme Court denied free
66
exercise exemptions was by giving great deference to military policy.
The Supreme Court also gave great deference to the government when the
government argued that a religious exemption is precluded by a policy embodied
in a congressional statute or government policy.67 For example, in Bowen v. Roy,
a Native American family requested an exemption from an Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) policy requiring a Social Security number to receive
65 See Lupu, supra note 62, at 177-78; Thomas A. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought?

An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REv. 1, 5-12
(1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S.
Code, 56 MONT. L. Rev. 249, 264-83 (1995). Professor Lupu states that in employing the
compelling interest test from Sherbert and Yoder prior to Smith, the Court rarely granted
an exemption:
This startling trend, in which the existence of a purportedly religion
protective doctrine turned out to be no barrier to a long string of
religion-suppressing decisions, had three crucial components-the
exemption doctrines triggering mechanism [using the substantial burden requirement to find that the religious person or groups were not
actually burdened by the application of the general law], its exclusion
of certain government enclaves [military and prison policy was given
deferential treatment by the courts], and the force and focus of its
demand for governmental justification [watering down the compelling
interest test by citing the general importance of tax laws].
See generally Lupu, supra note 62, at 264-83 (citations omitted).
66 See Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Robison, 415 U.S.

361 (1974); Gillette, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). In Goldman a Jewish Air Force captain sought
a religious exemption from a military regulation prohibiting headgear indoors so that
he could wear his yarmulke, which is traditional Jewish headgear. Goldman, 475 U.S. at
505. The Government's interest for the policy was to maintain discipline, morale, order
and hierarchical unity. Id. at 507-08. The Court refused to apply a compelling interest
standard stating that "great deference" must be given to the judgment of military officials
in applying their uniform policies. Id. at 507. See also Gillette, 401 U.S. at 437, 462
(holding that the "substantial governmental interest" of procuring necessary manpower to
raise an army precluded an exception under the conscientious objector's statute, despite
the objector's "incidential burdens"); Robison, 415 U.S. at 384-85 (finding the compelling
interests of making the military more attractive and raising manpower for the military
justified a burden on the religious convictions of the plaintiff religious conscientious
objector).
67 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Lyng presented a similar line of reasoning to that used in
Bowen. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). In Lyng, a group of Native Americans sought to enjoin
the U.S. Forest Service from building a road through a sacred area which "would cause
serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an integral and necessary
part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples." Id. at 442.
The group argued that the burden on their religious practices was heavy enough to violate
the Free Exercise Clause unless the Government could demonstrate a compelling need to

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/7
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benefits because giving their daughter a Social Security number would "rob her
spirit. ' 68 The Court declined to use the compelling interest test stating:
Absent proof of an intent to discriminate against particular religious beliefs or against religion in general, the Government meets
its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement
for government benefits, neutral and uniform in its application,
69

is a reasonablemeans ofpromotingpublic interest.

Since the law was facially neutral, the Court reasoned that Congress made no
individualized exemptions within AFDC and the Government had a compelling
interest in preventing fraud and facilitating administrative ease by using social
security numbers.70 The Court noted that there was no proof of fraudulent
attempts to obtain benefits from the AFDC through use of false Social Security
numbers.7 A "slight risk," however, would justify the Government's reasons to
72
disallow an exemption.
During this time, the high court also deferred to the government's interest
in uniform application of its laws. 73 In United States v. Lee, a member of the
complete the road. Id. at 447. The Court disagreed stating the Government's determination to use its land in the manner it did was a compelling interest in itself. Id. at 452. The
Court basically provided a rule that admitted no judicially crafted exemptions:
The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to
none of them a veto power over public programs that do not prohibit
the free exercise of religion. The Constitution does not, and the courts
cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably
arise in so diverse a society as ours. That task, to the extent that it is
feasible, is for the legislature and other institutions.

Id.
68 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 696.
69

70
71
72

Id. at 707-08 (emphasis added).
Id. at 709-12.

Id. at 711.
Id. The Court stated that:
[W]e know of no case obligating the Government to tolerate a slight
risk of "one or perhaps a few individuals" fraudulently obtaining benefits in order to satisfy a religious objection to a requirement designed
to combat that very risk. Appellees may not use the Free Exercise
Clause to demand Government benefits, but only on their own terms,
particularly where that insistence works a demonstrable disadvantage
to the Government in the administration of the programs.

Id.
73 See

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680

(1989).
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Old Amish Order challenged his mandatory participation in the Social Security
system. 74 The Order's claim rested on the ground that "the Amish believe it sinful not to provide for their own elderly and therefore are religiously opposed to
the national social security system. ' 75 The Court held that "[b]ecause the broad
public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious
76
belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.
The Court's reasoning did not rest on applying the exemption to the Amish so
much as to any religious objector.77 The Court used general statements regarding
the importance of uniformity rather than a fact-specific inquiry into the Social
78
Security system's feasibility in allowing an exemption for the Amish.
Similarly, the issue in Hernandez v. Commissionerwas whether religious training sessions (called "auditing") conducted by the Church of Scientology were
deductible under the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) code. 79 The IRS argued that
a contribution is not a true "gift" if there is some quid pro quo, and therefore
not tax deductible under an executive branch interpretation of the tax statutes.8"
Relying heavily on Lee, the Court held that, although it was questionable as to
whether the Scientology Church suffered a burden, "even a substantial burden [on
religious practice] would be justified by the 'broad public interest in maintaining
a sound tax system' free from 'myriad of exceptions flowing from a wide variety
of religious beliefs."' 8 Again, the overriding governmental interest in uniformity
2
precluded any individualized exemptions from a government law.1
Thus, the compelling interest test set forth in Sherbert and Yoder was slowly
diminished: "Between 1980 and 1990, the law became decidedly less favorable
to free exercise. The law... beg[a]n to operate in ways that insulated the government from having to satisfy the compelling interest standard, and the standard
itself had been subtly weakened in Lee .
",83 It is clear that the Supreme Court

7' Lee, 455

U.S. at 254-55.
7 Id. at 255.
76

Id. at 260.

Id. at 259-60 (stating if religious exemptions were allowed, "it would be difficult to
accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing
from a wide variety of religious beliefs.").
78 Id. at 258. The Court noted that "[w]idespread individual voluntary coverage under
social security . . . would undermine the soundness of the social security program." Id.
(citing S. REP. No. 404, pt. 1 at 116 (1965)).
79 Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1989).
88 Id. at 687-88.
81Id. at 699-700.
82 Id. at 700. The Court stated that the tax code "must be uniformly applicable to all,
except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise." Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 261 (1982)).
83 See Lupu, supra note 62, at 85.
77
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employed both a stronger, fact-specific compelling interest test, like that used in
Sherbert and Yoder, and a weaker, generalized compelling interest test used prior

to, and after, Sherbert and Yoder in Braunfield,Lee, Goldman, and Bowen.84
The Supreme CourtAbolished the Compelling Interest Test of the
Free Exercise Clause
Twenty-seven years after the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert, the high
court completely abolished the compelling interest test for claims of exemption

under free exercise in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith.8 5 In Smith, two members of the Native American Church were
fired from a drug rehabilitation facility for using peyote for sacramental purposes
as part of their religious ceremonies.86 When they applied for unemployment
benefits, the state deemed them ineligible because they had been fired for workrelated misconduct.8 7 A state law criminalizing possession of peyote prohibited
the sacramental peyote use by the two men.88 With Justice Scalia writing for the
majority, the Court held that the right to religious free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).8 9 Free exercise was still protected from laws that
purposefully prohibited it. 90 Neutral generally applicable laws that substantially
burden a religious practice, however, no longer had to be justified by a "compelling governmental interest."' The high court justified its position by pointing
out that, since Sherbert, the Court had not allowed an exemption to a general law
of applicability unless suit was brought in conjunction with other constitutional
protections.92 The Court also stated that its decision was consistent with decisions
it made in the past because it generally upheld a government's reason for applying

See supra notes 44-83 and accompanying text.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
86 Id. at 875-76.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
90 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
84
85

91Id. at 886-88.
92 Id. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). The Court noted that the
issue in Yoder was: "Invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish
parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school." Id. Smith also
distinguished itself from Sherbert and other unemployment cases granting an exemption
under a Free Exercise theory by stating that, in those cases, the state law did not prohibit
the conduct of those seeking religious exemption. In Smith, however, the Oregon statute
did prohibit the use of peyote. Id.at 876.
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a law to those seeking religious exemption."3 The Court explained that, before
Smith, it never applied a true compelling interest test because applying a true
compelling interest test to government laws of general applicability would have a
94
disastrous effect.

Congress Codifies the Compelling Interest Test
In 1993, in response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). 95 The congressional findings incorporated into RFRA
provide that "the compelling interest test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing governmental interests. '96 RFRA states that laws that are religiously
neutral on their face can be as burdensome on religious exercise as laws designed
to interfere with religion. 97 The act's operative section states:
(a) IN GENERAL.-Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) EXCEPTION.-Government may substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.98
Congress's purpose for passing RFRA was to restore "the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner ... and Wisconsin v. Yoder ... and its application
Id. at 883-84 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)).
94 Id. at 888. The Court stated:
93

If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all, then, it must
be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously
commanded. Moreover, if 'compelling interest' really means what it
says (and watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other
fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test. Any society
adopting such a system would be courting anarchy ....
Id.
95 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. % 2000bb-1-4 (2000); Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. 103-14, 107 Star. 1488) (1993).
96 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2000).
97 Id. § 2000bb(a)(2).
98

Id. § 2000bb-1.
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in all cases where free exercise is substantially burdened."'" RFRA is set up to
"provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially
burdened by the government. " "o
Legislative Intent of RFRA's CompellingInterest Test
Although the language in RFRA restored the compelling interest test set forth
in Sherbert and Yoder, the legislative history makes it unclear as to whether RFRA
is meant to restore the more heightened test set forth by Sherbertand Yoder or the
subsequent Supreme Court interpretations of the compelling interest test which
limited and distinguished Sherbert and Yoder. °I RFRA does not codify the result
reached in any prior free exercise decision. °2 The House Committee instructed
courts to refer to free exercise cases prior to Smith:
It is the Committee's expectation that the courts will look to free
exercise of religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in
determining whether or not religious exercise has been burdened
and the least restrictive means have been employed in furthering
a compelling governmental interest. Furthermore, by enacting
this legislation, the Committee neither approves nor disapproves of
the result in any particularcourt decision involving the free exercise
ofreligion, includingthose citedin this bill.This bill is not a codification of any prior free exercise decision but ratherthe restoration
ofthe legal standardthat was applied in those decisions. Therefore,
the compelling governmental interest test should be applied to
all cases where the exercise of religion is substantially burdened;
however, the test generally should be construed more stringently or
13
more leniently than it was prior to Smith.

§ 2000bb(b)(1).
100Id. § 2000bb(b)(2).
101See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpretingthe Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 73 TEx. L. REv. 209, 217-35 (1994); Berg, supra note 65, at 17-21; Paulsen, supra
note 65, at 283-91 (analyzing the language and legislative history of RFRA to determine
which standard Congress intended).
"02See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 19 (1993); H. REP. No. 103-88, at 16 (1993). See also
139 CONG. REc. H2358 (1993) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (statements concerning RFRA:
these "concerns have been resolved either through explicit statutory changes or through
committee report language").
103 S. REP. No. 103-111, at 16 (emphasis added). H. REP. No. 103-88, at 16 (reciting
substantially the same language as the Senate Report). Cf H. REP. No. 103-88, at 19
(stating "[t]o be absolutely clear, the bill does not expand, contract or alter the ability of a
claimant to obtain relief in a manner consistent with free exercise jurisprudence, including
Supreme Court jurisprudence, under the compelling governmental interest test prior to
Smith.").
99 Id.
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In addition to this language, there are several points in the committee reports
that state the Act's purpose "is only to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in
1 4
Congress cited to Sherbert and Yoder and subsequent decisions applySmith.""
ing a reduced compelling interest test in the background section of the House and
Senate Reports. 0

5

0 6
Congress clearly stated that general laws of applicability are subject to RFRA.1
But Congress also granted exemptions to particular government activities, stating,
"it is clear that strict scrutiny does not apply to government actions involving only

management or internal Government affairs or the use of the Government's own
property or resources.""0 7 Thus, RFRA "will not guarantee that religious claimants
bringing free exercise challenges will win, but only that they have a chance to
fight."108

"0S. REP. No. 103-111, at 36; cf.H. REP. No. 103-88, at 16 (stating that the committee
expects "the courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance
in determining whether the exercise of religion has been substantially burdened and the
least restrictive means have been employed in furthering a compelling interest"); cf.Id. at
3 (Views of Rep. Hyde, Rep. Sensenbrenner, Rep. McCollum, Rep. Coble, Rep. Canady,
Rep. Inglis, Rep. Goodlatte): "[RFRA did not reflect] the high water mark as found in
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, but merely returns the law to the state as it
existed prior to Smith").
105S.REP. No. 103-111, at 3-6; see also H. REP. No. 103-88, at 2-3, 10-13. Congress
stated: "using strict scrutiny, the Court held that the free exercise interest of the Old Order
Amish outweighed the interest of the state compulsory education statute." Id. at 13 (citing
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). "[S]imilarly the Court has used the compelling
governmental interest test and upheld the disputed governmental statute or regulation."
Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
106 H. REP. No. 103-88 at 16. The Congressional Report stated:
All governmental actions which have a substantial impact on the
practice of religion would be subject to the restrictions in this bill. In
this regard, in order to violate the statute, government activity need
not coerce individuals into violating their religious beliefs nor penalize
religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights,
benefits and privileges enjoyed by any citizen. Rather, the test applies
whenever a law or an action taken by the government to implement a
law burdens a person's exercise of religion.
Id.
107S. REP. No. 103-111 at 16 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Lyng v.

Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Congress stated: "the
Court held that the manner in which the Government manages its internal affairs and
uses its own property does not constitute a cognizable 'burden' on anyone's exercise of
religion." Id. at 19.
108 139 CONG. REc. H2358 (1993) (statement of Rep. Hyde). See also 139 CONG. REC.
H2358 at S14, 351 (1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Not every free exercise claim
will prevail, just as not every claim prevailed prior to the Smith decision.").
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RFRA Applied in the FederalCourts
RFRA originally applied to both state and federal governments.' °9 In City of
Boerne v. Flores, however, the Supreme Court found RFRA unconstitutional as
applied to state laws." 0 In the wake of Boerne, Congress amended RFRA only to
apply to the federal government."' Since Boerne, some courts have found RFRA
unconstitutional as applied to federal law." 2 A majority of federal circuit courts,
however, still find applying RFRA to federal laws is constitutional." 3
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal the question
presented was whether the district court erred in finding that, under RFRA, the
Government had not met its burden of demonstrating a compelling interest thereby

109 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1). RFRA originally applied to any "branch, department

agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the
United States," as well as to any "State, or ... subdivision of a State." Id.
...City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In City of Boerne the Court reasoned

that RFRA exceeded Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 532-34. Also, RFRA contradicted
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and federal-state balance. Id. at
534-36. RFRA was not based on a history of religious discrimination nor in proportion
to supposed remedial or preventative object and constitutes a high level congressional
intrusion into states' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate themselves.
Id. at 531-32.
. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub.L. 106-274, § 7(a)(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-2 (2000).
112 See Edward J.W Blanik, No RFRAF Allowed: The Status of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts FederalApplication in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores, 98 COLUM. L.
REv. 1410, 1412 (1998) (citing cases in the sixth circuit, seventh circuit, bankruptcy
courts and district courts which have rejected claims under RFRA reasoning that such
claims are moot as a result of Boerne).
113 See generally Hankins v. Lyght, 441 E3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding RFRA constitutional
as applied to federal law under Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution). See also
O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 E3d 399 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal law under Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution);
Guam v. Guerrero, 290 E3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding RFRA applied to the federal
realm is within Congress' plenary power and thus comported with separation of powers
doctrine); In re Young, 141 E3d 854 (8th Cit. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811 (1998)
(holding Congress had the plenary authority to enact Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) and make it applicable to the United States bankruptcy laws); Kikumura v.
Hurley, 242 E3d 950 (10th Cit. 2001) (Boerne invalidated RFRA only as applied to state
and local governments, not as applied to federal government through Congress's Article
I enforcement powers); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 E3d 156
(D.C. Cit. 2003) (RFRA constitutionally applies to the federal government).
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granting the preliminary injunction to the UDV."4 The United States Supreme
Court reviewed the district court's legal rulings de novo and its ultimate decision
15
to issue the preliminary injunction to the UDV for abuse of discretion.
Justice Roberts, writing the unanimous decision for the Court, noted Smith
held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit
the government from burdening religious practices through generally applicable
laws.116 The Court followed by stating that under RFRA, the federal government
may not, as a statutory matter, substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
"even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability."" 7 The only exception recognized by the statute requires the Government to satisfy a compelling
interest test, or demonstrate that the burden to the person is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.118
The Government did not challenge the district court's factual findings or
the conclusion that the evidence submitted on the issues was evenly balanced. 9
Instead the Government maintained that such evidentiary equipoise was an insufficient basis for issuing a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
Controlled Substances Act. 2 ° The Government began by stating that the party
seeking pretrial relief bears the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on
the merits.' 2' The Government argued that in granting the preliminary injunction
based on a tie in the evidentiary record, the district court lost sight of the burden
that UDV would have to bear in order to receive the injunction under RFRA.122
UDV countered that, since the Government conceded its prima facie case
under RFRA (application of the CSA would substantially burden a sincere religious
exercise of their religion), the Government had the burden of demonstrating that it

114Gonzales

v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1216

(2006).
115Id. at 1219 (citing McCreary County v. A.C.L.U., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2737-38 (2005)).
116 Id. at 1216 (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990)). The Court noted that Smith rejected the interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause announced in Sherbert, and in doing so held that the Constitution does
not require judges to engage in a case-by-case assessment of the religious burdens imposed
by facially constitutional laws. Id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-90).
"7 Id. at 1216-17 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)).
"8 Id. at 1217 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)).
119 Id. at 1218. See Brief for Petitioners at 8-9, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006) (No. 04-1084).
120

Id.

Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1219 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997);
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975)).
121 0
122

Id. at 1219.
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had a compelling interest to apply the CSA to the UDV.121 Since the Government
bore this burden, and the evidence was in equipoise, the Government must lose
at the preliminary injunction stage of the litigation. 124
The 0 Centro Court rejected the Government's argument that under RFRA
evidentiary equipoise is an insufficient basis for issuing a preliminary injunction
against application of the CSA. 125 Because the Government conceded the UDV's
prima facie case under RFRA, the evidence the district court found to be in
equipoise related to the compelling interests by the Government asserted as part
of its affirmative defense. 126 However, according to the provisions of the statute,
the government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest. 127 Since the Court's recent decision in
Ashcroft v. A. CL. U. stated the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track
the burdens at trial, the Government bore the burden of showing a compelling
governmental interest in applying the CSA to the UDV's religious exercise at the
128
preliminary injunction stage.
The Government's second argument centered on the language of the CSA
itself.129 The Government focused on the description of the CSA's Schedule I
substances as having "a high potential for abuse .... no currently accepted use in
treatment in the United States.... [and] a lack of accepted safety for use.., under
medical supervision."' 130 The Government argued this language itself precluded
individualized exemptions like that sought by the UDV.131 The Government
further argued that the regulatory regime established by the CSA was a "closed"
system that prohibited all use of controlled substances except as authorized by the

123 Brief for Respondents at 34, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do
Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006) (No. 04-1048).
124 Id. at 24 (citing Dir. Office of Workers Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512
U.S. 267, 272 (1994)) ("[When] the evidence is evenly balanced, the party that bears the
burden of persuasion must lose.").
125 0 Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1219-20.
126 Id. at 1219.
127 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(3) (stating that "demonstrates" means meets the

burden of going forward with the evidence and persuasion)).
128 Id. at 1219-20 (citing Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656 (2004)). The Government
argued that Ashcroft v. A. CL. U.was distinguishable from 0 Centro because it involved
content based restrictions on speech. Id. The Court reasoned that Congress's express decision to legislate the compelling interest test indicated that RFRA challenges should be
adjudicated in the same manner as other applications of the test. Id.
129 0 Centro, 126 S.Ct.at 1220.
130 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)).
131 Id. at 1220.
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Act itself. 13 2 Because the CSA was a "closed" system, religious exceptions could
not be cabined once recognized and the "public will misread" such exceptions as
signaling that the substance at issue is not harmful.133 Based on the Government's
argument, there was no need to assess the particular facts of the UDV's use or
weigh the impact of an exemption for that specific use because the CSA serves a
13 4
compelling purpose and simply admits no exceptions.
The UDV countered that the uniform application of the CSA is not a compelling interest. 135 UDV's argument focused on the proposition that the Native
American Church (NAC) has had a longstanding exemption for peyote, also a
Schedule I substance under the CSA. 136 More recently, all members of federally
recognized tribes enjoy this exemption under the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act Amendments of 1994 (AIRFA).137 The UDV argued that the proposition the CSA needed to be uniformly applied to the UDV was undermined
because the federal government had been successful in allowing a peyote exemption to Native America tribes. 138 The UDV stated that, because RFRA required a
fact-specific inquiry of the merits of each claim, recognizing a narrow exemption
for UDV based on the unique facts of this case would not 1inevitably
lead to the
creation of a large number of religious CSA exemptions. 39 Further, since the
Government conceded that application of the CSA to the UDV's religious exercise met the prima facie case under RFRA, the burden shifted to the Government
at the preliminary injunction stage of the litigation to show it had a compelling
interest in enforcing the CSA and enforcement of the CSA was the least restrictive
means of carrying out that compelling interest.14 °
The Court foreclosed the Government's argument that the language of the
CSA itself was enough to show a compelling state interest. 4' RFRA and its strict
scrutiny test required the government to demonstrate that the compelling interest
test is satisfied by applying the challenged law "to the person," the particular

See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 119, at 18 ("The effectiveness of that closed system
will necessarily be undercut by judicially crafted exemptions on terms far more generous than the narrow clinical studies that Congress authorized." (citing United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 492, 499 (2001)).
33
1 Id. at 23.
1340 Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1220. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 119 at 19-21 (arguing
that if it gives an exception to one group, it would receive a "myriad" of other claims to
religious exemptions under CSA).
135 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 40-45.
136 Id. at 4 (citing 21 C.ER. § 1307.31 (2005)).
137 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2000)).
138 Id. at 40-45.
139 Id. at 44.
140 Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 47-49.
141 0 Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1220.
132
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245

claimant, whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened. 142
14 3
RFRA adopted the compelling interest test set forth by Sherbertand Yoder. 0
Centro stated, "The Court, in those cases, looked beyond the broadly formulated
interests justifying the general applicability of government laws and scrutinized the
'' 44
asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants. 1
Because Sherbert and Yoder demanded a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry, the
Government's recital of the language from Schedule I of the CSA could not "carry
'
the day."145
0 Centro then turned its analysis to applying a fact-specific compelling
interest test under RFRA. 46 The Court acknowledged the dangers of the DMT
found in hoasca, but stated there was no indication that Congress considered the
substance's sacramental use when classifying DMT in Schedule J.'47 To support
this position, the Supreme Court noted that the CSA contains a provision authorizing the Attorney General to waive registration requirements for "manufacturers,

42

1

Id. at 1220 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I(b)).
Id. at 1220-21.

144

Id. The Court cited the specific facts of Yoder and Sherbert.

'

In Yoder,[ . ..]we permitted an exemption for Amish children from a
compulsory school attendance law. We recognized that the State had a
"paramount" interest in education, but held that "despite its admitted
validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the
interests that the State seeks to promote.. .and the impediment to those
objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimedAmish exemption." 406 U.S., at 213, 221, 92 S.Ct. 1526. The Court explained that
the State needed "to show with more particularity how its admittedly
strong interest ... would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish." Id., at 236, 92 S.Ct. 1526. In Sherbert, the Court
upheld a particular claim to a religious exemption from a state law
denying unemployment benefits to those who would not work on
Saturdays, but explained that it was not announcing a constitutional
right to unemployment benefits "for all persons whose religious convictions are the cause of their unemployment." 374 U.S., at 410, 83
S.Ct. 1790.
0 Centro, 126 S.Ct. at 1220-21.
145Id. at 1221.
146 See id. 1221-25.
147 0 Centro, 126 S.Ct. at 1221. The Court considered the Government's argument that
the placement of DMT in Schedule I of the CSA automatically made enforcement of
the CSA a compelling interest unavailing: "[Clongress' determination that DMT should
be listed under Schedule I simply does not provide a categorical answer that relieves the
Government of the obligation to shoulder its burden under RFRA." Id.
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14
distributors or dispensers" if he finds it consistent with public health and safety.
The Court stated the fact that "the Act itself contemplates that exempting certain
people from its requirements would be 'consistent with the public health and
safety' and this provision indicates that congressional findings with respect to
Schedule I substances should not carry determinative weight, for RFRA purposes,
49
that the Government would ascribe them."'

Generally invoking the language of Schedule I was also unavailing because of
the thirty-five-year regulatory exemption that the Native American Church has
enjoyed for the use of another Schedule I drug, peyote. 5 ° The Court compared
DMT to mescaline peyote and found that the Schedule I provisions considering
the alleged harmful effects associated with its use applied in equal measure to both
substances, yet the Executive and Legislative branches gave Native Americans an
exemption from the CSA for religious uses.' 51 The high court reasoned if such
an exception was granted to hundreds of thousands of Native Americans for the
religious use of peyote, it would be difficult to justify the denial of a similar exception for 130 American members of the UDV for their religious hoasca use.' 52 The
Government countered that the existence of a congressional exemption for peyote
does not indicate that the CSA is vulnerable to judicially made exceptions.' 53 The
Court made clear, however, that RFRA plainly contemplates that courts should
recognize exceptions and it is the Court's obligation to consider whether exceptions are required under RFRA. 54
The peyote exception completely undermined the Government's contention
that the CSA establishes a closed regulatory scheme that admits no exceptions
under RFRA. 155 Exceptions to the CSA, judicially created under RFRA, would
not necessarily undercut the CSA's effectiveness because there is no evidence the
156
peyote exception has undercut the government's ability to enforce the CSA.
Id. at 1221 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 822(d)).
Id. at 1221.
150 Id. at 1222 (citing 21 C.ER. § 1307.31 (2005)). The Court also noted that in 1994
this exemption was extended to all members of every recognized Indian Tribe. 0 Centro,
126 S. Ct. at 1222 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1)).
151Id. at 1222.
152 Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Balbalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)
(quoting Florida Star v. B.J. E 491 U.S. 524, 541-542 (1989)) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) ("It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence
that [ ] a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order' . . . when
it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.")).
151 0 Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1222.
151 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) ("A person whose religious exercise has been
burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a
judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.")).
155Id. at 1222.
156 Id. at 1223.
148
149
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The Government's argument that the need for uniformity in application of the
CSA justified a substantial burden on the religious free exercise of the UDV was
not supported by other pre-Smith cases that dealt with the issue of uniformity
as a compelling governmental interest. 57 The Court reasoned that the slippery
slope argument, if the Government offered an exception to one group, it would
have to offer an exception to every group, is unavailing because RFRA mandates
consideration of exceptions to rules of general applicability.'58 The Court upheld
the feasibility of a case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions to general
laws of applicability under this test. 59 In the end, the Court followed Congress's
157

Id. The Court stated that:

In United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127
(1982) ....
the Court rejected a claimed exception to the obligation
to pay Social Security taxes, noting that "mandatory participation is
indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system" and that
the "tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to
challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manor
that violates their religious beliefs." Id., at 258, 260, 102 S.Ct. 1051
• . . [citation omitted] . . . In Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion), the Court
decided a claimed exception to Sunday closing laws, in part because
allowing such exceptions "might well provide [the claimants] with an
economic advantage over their competitors who must remain closed
on that day." Id., at 608-609, 81 S.Ct. 1144. The whole point of a
"uniform day of rest for all workers" would have been defeated by
exceptions. [citations omitted]. These cases show that the Government
can demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of the
particular program by offering evidence that granting the request
religious accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to
administer the program.
Id. at 1223.
'58 0 Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1223. The Court stated that "Congress determined that the leg-

islated test 'is a workable test for striking balances between religious liberty and competing
prior governmental interest."' Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5)).
159 Id. at 1223-24. The Court gave other instances where the high court applied the compelling interest test. Id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)). The Court
also found the district court had erred in determining that the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances did not apply to the CSA. Id. at 1224-25. In interpreting the
convention, the high court held that, since the convention covered a "preparation" which
included "any solution or mixture" and hoasca was a "solution or mixture" in the sense
that it is made by the simple process of brewing plants in water, and therefore clearly
covered under the convention. Id. (citing 32 U.S.T., at 546, Art. 1 (f)(i); id., at 551, Art.
3.). Although hoasca is covered by the convention, the Court denied the Government's
argument that applying the CSA to the UDV's religious exercise, in accordance with the
Convention, was a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 1225. The Court reasoned this
was because the Government failed to submit any evidence addressing the international
consequences of granting an exemption for the UDV's use of hoasca. Id.
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determination that under RFRA, courts should strike sensible balances, using a
compelling interest test that requires the government to address the particular
practice at issue.160 In applying the stronger, fact specific compelling interest test
and the weaker, more generalized compelling interest test, the Supreme Court
concluded that the courts below did not err in determining, at the preliminary
injunction stage, the Government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in
barring the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca.161
ANALYSIS

This analysis will demonstrate how the Court's simultaneous approval of a
heightened and weakened compelling interest standard is irreconcilable. 0 Centro
gives conflicting reasoning to justify its holding denying the government's proffered compelling interest of uniformity of enforcement of the CSA. Furthermore,
0 Centro gives us a nebulous and conflicted interpretation of which compelling
interest test to use in the future under RFRA.
Despite the apparent ambiguity regarding how leniently or strictly to apply
the compelling interest test, RFRA's "findings" section states Congress's view that
"the compelling interest test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
prior governmental interests."' 162 It is contradictory for RFRA to apply both the
stronger version of the compelling interest test set out by Sherbert and Yoder, yet
also apply the weaker compelling interest test of cases such as Lee, Braunfield,
and Hernandez.163 To add to the uncertainty, it did not appear that some RFRA
supporters had much faith in the compelling interest test to protect free exercise
claimants, despite RFRAs language pointing to Sherbertand Yoder.'64 Indeed, the

160 Id. at

1224-25.
Id.
162 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2000).
163 See Paulsen, supra note 65, at 289. Professor Paulsen states a possible explanation:
161

While the evidence is that Congress did not wish to get mired down in
arguing the merits of each particular case, there is no evidence that they
deliberately intended to embrace contradiction. Rather, the evidence is
that they consciously chose not to validate the state of free exercise law
as it existed the day before Smith was decided but instead to embrace
the Sherbert-Yoder test without simultaneously validating all of that
test's (mis-) applications by the courts.
Id. (citations omitted).
161H. RE'. No. 103-88 at 4 (Views of Rep. Hyde, Rep. Sensenbrenner, Rep. McCollum,
Rep. Coble, Rep. Canady, Rep. Inglis, Rep. Goodlatte). Inquiring "will the RFRA work?"
Reps. Hyde, Sensenbrenner, McCollum, Coble, Canday, Inglis and Goodlatte stated:
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Supreme Court in pre-Smith free exercise cases exerted broad discretion in finding
that government laws comprised a compelling interest.165
Congress clearly recognized the struggle to define the compelling interest
test under RFRA would mirror the struggle the Supreme Court had in defining
compelling interest prior to RFRA's enactment.166 Perhaps the ambiguousness of
RFRA's compelling interest standard reflects the political compromise involved in
formation of a broad coalition of support for RFRA. 167 More optimistic explanations of RFRA's ambiguousness also exist:
In justification of the need for this legislation, proponents have provided the Committee with long lists of cases in which free exercise
claims have failed since Smith was decided. Unfortunately, however,
even prior to Smith, it is well known that the "compelling state interest" test had proven an unsatisfactory means of providing protection for
individuals trying to exercise their religion in the face of government
regulations. Restoration of the pre-Smith standard, although politically
practical, will likely prove, over time, to be an insufficient remedy. It
would have been preferable, given the unique opportunity presented
by this legislation, to find a solution that would give solid protection to
religious claimants against unnecessary government intrusion.
Id.
165 See Eric Alan Shumsky, The Religious Freedom RestorationAct: Postmortem of a Failed

Statute, 102 W VA. L. REv. 81, 113 (1999). Professor Shumsky points to the broad
discretion that courts enjoyed defining a compelling governmental interest in upholding
a law prior to RFRA:
Simply put, "Courts possess enormous discretion over how broadly
or narrowly government interests are defined .... In the absence of
any theoretical guide, judges have used their control over generality
to strike down government policies that they just as easily could have
upheld." Conversely, in the absence of proper limits, courts might
define an interest broadly, thereby ensuring its success. In the context
of religious free exercise, broad definition has been the norm.
Id. (quoting Roger Craig Green, Interest Definition in Equal Protection:A Study ofJudicial
Technique, 108 YALE L.J. 439, 447-49 (1998)).
166 H. REP. No. 103-88 at 6 (Views of Rep. Hyde, Rep. Sensenbrenner, Rep. McCollum,
Rep. Coble, Rep. Canady, Rep. Inglis, Rep. Goodlatte) stating:
In reality, the Act [RFRA] will not guarantee that religious claimants
bringing free exercise challenges will win, but only that they have a
chance to fight. It will perpetuate, by statute both the benefits and
frustrations faced by religious claimants prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith. Although we have this remaining concern, we support enactment of the legislation.
Id.
167

See Laycock &Thomas, supra note 101, at 218-19. Professors Laycock and Thomas

state:
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But it [RFRA's generality] was not merely a political necessity; it
was also an act of high principle. The Act is only a statute, not a
constitutional amendment, but it is a statute designed to perform
a constitutional function. It is designed to restore the rights that
previously existed under the Free Exercise Clause, rights that
Congress believes should exist if the Constitution were properly
interpreted. As a replacement for the Free Exercise Clause, the
Act had to be as universal as the Free Exercise Clause. It had to
protect all religions equally against all assertions of regulatory
interests. The only way to draft such a protection was in the
manner of the Free Exercise Clause itself-as a general principle
168
of universal application.
Regardless of Congress' reasons for the ambiguousness of RFRA's compelling
interest test, RFRA contemplates that "the courts will look to free exercise
cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether the exercise
of religion has been substantially burdened and the least restrictive means have
been employed in furthering a compelling governmental interest."' 6 9 0 Centro is
the first instance where the Supreme Court potentially had the opportunity to
clarify which version of the compelling interest standard should be used under
RFRA7 °

Congress might have provided more guidance about the standard, but
it could not supplement the standard with legislative resolutions of
specific cases. There were both principled and political reasons for legislating only a general standard. Legislating generally made it possible
for a broad coalition of Senators, Representatives, and organizations
to support the bill. The bill was enacted unanimously in the House
and nearly so in the Senate, yet the vote would not have been similarly
unanimous on many applications of the bill. Most of those who would
find a compelling interest in protecting fetuses would probably not
find a compelling interest in requiring hospitals to perform abortions.
Most of those who would find a compelling interest in distributing
condoms to students would probably not find a compelling interest
in distributing military recruiting literature to students ....The cynical explanation for RFRAs generality is that enacting only a general
standard was a political necessity.
Id. (citations omitted).
168 Id. at 219 (citations omitted).
169 S.REP. No. 103-111 at 16.
1700 Centro, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1224-25.
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0 Centro Gives a Nebulous Definition of the Compelling Interest

Test under RFRA
The Court in 0 Centro rejected the Government's argument that uniformity
of application of the CSA constituted a compelling interest. 171 The Government's
uniformity argument relied on the notion that the CSA could not be properly
administered without its uniform application. 172 The Government's argument
that allowing an exemption to the UDV would require all similar exemptions was
slippery slope because this argument "echoed the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats
throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make an exception for everyone, so no exceptions."' 173 Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice
Roberts reasoned the Government in 0 Centro did not offer evidence demonstrating that granting the UDV an exemption would cause the kind of administrative
harm recognized as a compelling interest recognized in Lee, Hernandez, and
Braunfield.174 The Court characterized Lee, Hernandez, and Braunfield as cases
where "the government... demonstrate[d] a compelling interest in uniform application of a particular program by offering evidence that granting the requested
religious accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to administer

the program. "175
But using Lee, Hernandez, and Braunfield to reinforce the proposition that
fact-specific evidence is needed to demonstrate a compelling interest in uniformity of application of a law creates ambiguity because none of those cases
used the kind of fact-specific analysis found in 0 Centro.176 In Braunfield, the
Court relied on hypothetical situations that "might" or "probably" present themselves if it granted the requested exemption from the Sunday closing law. 177 In
Braunfield, the Government did not offer fact-specific evidence that the requested
71 Id. at
172

173
174

1224.

Id. at 1222-23. Cf Brief for Petitioners, supra note 119, at 16-26.

Id. at 1223.
Id.

Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1123.
Id. at 1223. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490
U.S. 680 (1989); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
'77 See Braunfield, 366 U.S. at 608-09. In discussing hypothetical situations that could
arise if the requested exemption was granted, the Court speculated:
175 0
176

To allow only people who rest on a day other than Sunday to keep
their business open on that day might well provide these people with
an economic advantage over their competitors who must remain closed
on that day; this might cause the Sunday-observers to complain that
their religions are being discriminated against. With this competitive
advantage existing, there could well be the temptation for some, in
order to keep their businesses open on Sunday, to assert that they have
religious convictions which compel them to close their businesses on
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exemption would actually cause these harms.'7 8 In Lee, the Court found that the
Government had a compelling interest in denying the Amish an exemption from
the Social Security tax because, in general, unless it was uniformly applied, the
79
Social Security tax would be difficult to administer with religious exemptions.1
Again, the asserted compelling interest in Lee was hypothetical, not applied to
the particular case of the Amish.'80 In reality, the requested Amish exemption
in Lee was nearly identical to an already existing exemption that Congress gave
to self-employed Amish. 8 ' Indeed, the Court in Lee engaged in formulating a
compelling interest test at a high level of abstraction, rather than a fact-specific
inquiry into the effect the Amish exemption would have on the Social Security
system. 1 82 Hernandez used a line of analysis substantially identical to Lee, citing

what had formerly been their least profitable day. This might make necessary a state-conducted inquiry into the sincerety of the individual's
religious beliefs ....
Finally, in order to keep the disruption of the
day at a minimum, exempted employees would probably have to hire
employees who themselves qualified for the exemption because of their
own religious beliefs, a practice which a State might feel to be opposed
to in its general policy prohibiting religious discrimination in hiring.
Id. (emphasis added).
178

Id.

179Lee, 455 U.S. at 259-60.
180Id. at 260. In discussing hypothetical situations where religious claimants would seek

exemption from the Social Security tax in the future, the Court stated:
If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a
certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted
to war-related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid
claim to be exempt from paying the percentage of the income tax.
The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to
challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner
that violates their religious beliefs.
Id. (emphasis added).
181Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 14 0 2 (g)). Cf id. at 262. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens
noted that:
As a matter of administration, it would be a relatively simple matter to
extend the exemption to the taxes involved in this case. As a matter of
fiscal policy, an enlarged exemption probably would benefit the social
security system because the nonpayment of these taxes by the Amish
would be more than offset by the elimination of their right to collect
benefits.
Id. (Stevens, J. concurring).
182 See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise
Clause, 57 OIO ST. L.J. 65, 81-2 (1996). Analyzing the approach the Court took in
Lee, Professors Gressman and Carmella explain that Lee engaged in a non-fact-specific
"definitional balancing":
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to Lee for its general reasons why the tax exemption should not be given to the
Scientology Church. 18 3 Paradoxically, the Government in 0 Centro offered the
same type of general evidence, that allowing exemptions from the CSA would
hypothetically create problems, as it did in Braunfield,Lee, and Hernandez.'84 Yet
the Government's argument that it had a compelling interest in uniform application of the CSA was not enough to deny a religious exemption. 8 5
The Court attempted to justify this discrepancy by characterizing Lee,
Hernandez, and Braunfieldascases that "did not embrace the notion that a general
interest in uniformity justified a substantial burden on religious exercise; they
instead scrutinized the asserted need and explained why the denied exemptions
Definitional balancing acts like a compromise between the categorical
approach and ad hoc balancing. The particularity of both the religious
claim and the government's interest- the focus of ad hoc balancing-is
gone. Instead, the Court evaluates the claimed liberty against social
interests at a high level of generality (and consequent abstractness) in
order to produce a rule directly applicable in future cases without the
need to balance. Definitional balancing thus yields classes of protected
and unprotected activity . . . The Court's definitional balancing in
United States v. Lee did not produce a general rule quite so hospitable
to religious claimants . . . Had the Court engaged in an ad hoc balance, it would have been hard to deny the claim [in Lee], as it was
structurally similar to Yoder: there was a clear burden on free exercise,
a showing of a compelling interest of the state in maintaining a social
security system for the elderly, but no showing that the social security
system would in any way be endangered by providing this exemption
for these Amish employers. In fact, an exemption already existed for
self-employed Amish, and this lawsuit simply sought to rationalize the
government's treatment of all-Amish businesses. But the Court chose
a definitional balance that announced a rule far beyond the Amish
community. While a burden on their religion was established, so was
an "overriding governmental interest" in preservation not of the social
security system, but ofa uniform federal taxation scheme free ofjudicial
exemptions. The government's interest was defined at a very high level
of abstraction, the hallmark of definitional balancing. For the Court to
carve out an exemption would mean that the floodgates would open:
the entire structure of federal taxation would be vulnerable to any
religious objections to payment of any tax.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
183 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699-700.
184 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 119, at 16-24 (the Government stating, inter alia,
that any exemption would have to be given to similarly situated adherents, market for
hoasca could become prevalent, administrative problems in closely regulating the use of
hoasca, medical exemptions to CSA would proliferate).
185 0 Centro, 126 at 1223-24 (stating "the Government has not offered evidence demonstrating that granting the UDV an exemption would cause the kind of administrative
harm recognized as a compelling interest in Lee, Hernandez,and Braunfield').
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could not be accommodated." 18 6 This analysis is unavailing simply because
Braunfied, Lee, and Hernandez embraced the notion that a general interest in
uniformity justified a substantial burden on religious exercise. 187 Further, in these
cases the Court acknowledged that application of the laws in question burdened
the claimant's religious exercise or that the law was compelling regardless of a
substantial burden on religion.188 Thus, 0 Centro's incorporation of Braunfield,
Lee, and Hernandez is problematic because it is difficult to square the Court's
analysis of the latter three cases with 0 Centro and RFRA's legislative history.189
The Government's argument that the language of the CSA precludes an
exemption because the CSA is a "closed system" relied on the assumption that
there would be no way to allow for some religious exemptions and not others
as soon as an exemption is recognized for the UDV.1 9° 0 Centro stated that a
law which allows exemptions cannot be cited to show compelling interests in
disallowing exemptions to that same law since the CSA already provided for
exemptions authorized by the Attorney General and peyote had a longstanding
exemption under Schedule I.191 This principal is problematic because pre-Smith
case law, including pre-Smith case law cited in 0 Centro's analysis, involved laws
that granted exemptions to other religious practitioners but denied religious
192
exemptions to the claimants.
186

Id. at 1223.

187See supra notes 175-85.
188See Braunfield v. Brown,

366 U.S. 599, 605-606 (acknowledging the "Sunday Closing
Law" would result in financial sacrifice or an "indirect economic burden" for Jewish practitioners); Lee, 455 U.S. at 257 (accepting the appellee's contention that both payment
and receipt of social security benefits interferes with their free exercise rights); Hernandez,
490 U.S. at 699-700 (stating that even a substantial burden would be justified by the

"broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system" free of "myriad exceptions
flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs."); cf Braunfield,366 U.S. at 616 (Stewart,
J., dissenting) ("Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose
between his religious faith and his economic survival ... [i]t is a choice which I think no
State can constitutionally demand.").
189 H. REP. No. 103-88 at 18 (stating: "Pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act .

.

. seemingly reasonable regulations based upon speculation, exaggerated fears or

thoughtless policies cannot stand. Officials must show that the relevant regulations are the
least restrictive means of protecting a compelling governmental interest.").
190Id. at 1220. Cf Brief for Petitioners, supra note 119, at 16-22.
191Id. at 1222 (citing Church of Lukumi Balbalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547,
(1993) (quoting Florida Star v. B.J. E 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989)) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) ("It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence

that [ ] a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order' . . . when
it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.").
192 See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 447-55 (1971) (finding conscientious
objector's statute created an exemption from the draft; government's reasons for draft
still considered a compelling interest); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504-507

(1986) (noting Jewish solider wore his traditional religious yarmulke for several years
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In Hernandez, the Court found a compelling interest in the general uniformity
93
of the IRS code despite countless exemptions given to other religious groups.
In Lee, the exemption from the Social Security tax granted by the government
applied only to self-employed individuals, not Amish who are employers themselves.' 94 Despite a very similar exemption from the Social Security tax, the court
found that the Government had a compelling interest in the uniform application
of the tax. 195 Applying Sherbert and Yoder fact-specific analysis as interpreted by
0 Centro to the facts in Lee, the Government in Lee would have been required to
show that applying the tax provision to the Old Amish Order represents the least
restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest in uniformity
of the tax code. 96 Under the 0 Centro analysis, it would seem that since the
Social Security tax code (or other law) allows some exemptions, the government

before he was stopped from wearing it and finding government reasons for the policy
forbidding him to wear it were still considered compelling); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 254-55 (1982) (finding a similar exemption from the Social Security tax existed;
government's reasons for uniform application of the tax still considered compelling);
Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 684-86 (1989) (finding tax code allowed exemptions
for certain charitable contributions; government's interest in uniform application of the
tax code still held to be compelling).
193 Hernandez,490 U.S. at 701 (noting that a similar exemption was given for Jewish High
Holy Day services "[p]ew rents, building fund assessments, and periodic dues paid to a
church.., are all methods of making contributions to the church, and such payments are
deductible as charitable contributions within the limitations set out in section 170 of the
Code"). Cf Paulsen, supra note 65, at 268. Professor Paulsen stated:
The government, relying on Lee, took the position that the soundness of the tax system depends on the government's ability to apply
the tax law in a uniform and evenhanded fashion. But evidence was
clear that the government did not take this position with respect to
analogous practices-including analogous religious practices-such as
"pew rents" or sales of tickets for Jewish High Holy Day services. The
IRS had a formal written policy stating that those contributions were
deductible. Yet the "quid pro quo" feature of these contributions is
indistinguishable from the arrangement in Hernandez... Inconsistency
of the policy should have belied the assertion of a compelling interest
in "maintaining a sound tax system," free from "myriad exceptions."
Indeed, Hernandez seems to be a blatant case of discrimination among
religions.
Id. (citations omitted).
' Lee, 455 U.S. at 256.
115
96

1

Id. at 258-60.
See Michelle O' Connor, The Religious Freedom RestorationAct: Exactly What Rights Does

It "Restore" in the Federal Tax Context?, 36 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 321, 376-78 (2004). Professor
O'Connor explained:
Construing RFRA as requiring the courts to apply the Sherbert/Yoder
balancing test in the tax context would require the government to
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could not refer to the importance of uniformly maintaining the Social Security
tax code (or other law) as a compelling interest as it did in Lee, Hernandez, and
Braunfield.197 Therein lies the paradox: 0 Centro states that uniform application
of laws cannot be considered compelling if exemptions to the laws are already
allowed, yet Lee, Hernandez, and many other pre-Smith cases codified by RFRA
consider uniformity of application compelling despite their exemptions.' 98
0 Centro's citation of the compelling interest tests of Sherbert, Yoder, Lee, and
Hernandezprovides little guidance as to which compelling interest standard Courts
will utilize under RFRA in the future.' 99 Indeed, granting religious exemptions to
some claimants under a stronger compelling interest standard and denying other
religious exemptions under a weaker compelling interest standard would lead to

introduce evidence and to prove that a tax provision represents the
least-restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. Where the government fails to do so, the precepts of Sherbert and
Yoder dictate that it should lose. Because pre-Smith precedent in the
tax context never required the government to make such a showing
(and indeed the government never lost a tax case based on its failure
to do so), such a construction of the RFRA test would result in a more
"stringent" application of the pre-Smith compelling-interest
test.
Id. at 377 (citations omitted).
197

SeeJames Glenn Hardwood, Religiously-BasedSocialSecurity Exemptions: Who Is Eligible,
How Did They Develop, and Are the Exemptions Consistent With the Religion Clauses and
the Religious Freedom RestorationAct (RFRA)?, 17 AKRON TAx J. 1, 17-21 (2002). Professor
Hardwood stated:
In order for the law, which substantially burdens one's Free Exercise,
to pass constitutional muster, it must be the least restrictive means of
accomplishing a compelling governmental interest. If the compelling
governmental interest is the maintenance of the social security system
with provision for individuals to opt out, then the existing exemptions
provide evidence that either the current law is not the least restrictive
means of achieving those ends or those ends are not a compelling interest. If the compelling governmental interest is the maintenance of the
social security system, then the least restrictive means of achieving the
interest would be for the system to be compulsory to all. However, if
the government provides exemptions for some that object to the participation, then the government concedes that providing an exemption
does not frustrate the compelling governmental interest.
Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted).
198 See supra notes 190-197 and accompanying text.
19'Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 122324 (2006).
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patently unfair results.2 °° Since 0 Centro's analysis applies two conflicting versions
of the compelling interest test, it seems 0 Centro's decision does little to clarify the
ambiguities created by RFRA's legislative history and intent. 0'
CONCLUSION

Reasoning the Government had not demonstrated a compelling interest for
enforcement of the CSA, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a preliminary
injunction allowing the UDV to continue to practice its religion by consuming hoasca. The history of free exercise jurisprudence reveals that the Supreme
Court used conflicting interpretations of the compelling interest standard prior to
Smith. At times they would use a stronger, more fact specific compelling interest
standard found in Sherbert and Yoder. Prior to and after these decisions however
the Supreme Court relaxed the compelling interest standard, using a weakened,
generalized version of it to deny free exercise exemptions to many religious claimants. Since RFRXs authors simultaneously approved of both standards, RFRA left
it up to courts to decide which standard to use. Paradoxically, 0 Centro advocates
a fact-specific inquiry under the compelling interest test similar to that used in
Sherbert and Yoder, yet appeals to pre-Smith decisions that perform less-exacting
inquiries into the government's reasons for a compelling interest. Therefore, 0
Centro provides an ambiguous answer for what compelling interest test will be
applied under RFRA in the future. Given RFRAs ambiguous legislative history,
the Court seemed to have done its job by interpreting an ambiguous compelling
interest test ambiguously.

200 See Shumsky, supra note

165, at 114-15 (1999). Professor Shumsky notes the inequity
of the courts simultaneously applying two different standards of the compelling interest
test of RFRA in federal courts:
[Bly failing to use the same level of generality on both sides of the
balance, courts violate an essential premise of the method [compelling
interest standard]. If, in fact, a single scale describes the intersection
of individual liberty and government interests, the factors must be
measured in the same units. To do otherwise is akin to comparing the
weight of an apple in ounces to the weight of an orange in grams.
The comparison is possible, but a conversion table would be necessary
to understand the result. It is jurisprudentially unfair to manipulate
the generality of government and individual interests, amplifying the
importance of the government curtailment of religion while using the
same technique to mute the interests of the individual religious claimant. Whatever outcome might be desired as a normative matter, this
uncalibrated scale is sure to skew the result.
Id. (citations omitted).

20 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
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